INGLÉS II - TRABAJO PRÁCTICO Nº 6 – CIENCIA POLÍTICA


1-Mencione los estudios que ponen en evidencia que las instituciones son cruciales para evitar la violencia.

2-¿Cuáles son los dos elementos de especial relevancia en las instituciones?

3-¿Qué implica el término “legitimidad” en este informe?

4-Desarrolle lo planteado en cuanto a las dos fuentes de legitimidad más importantes.

5-Diferentes aspectos de la legitimidad institucional pueden vincularse al conflicto y a la violencia. Describa los acontecimientos que demuestran esta afirmación.

6-¿Qué puede explicar la fragilidad a nivel de las instituciones y de la gobernabilidad? ¿Cuáles son los ejemplos citados?

7-Desarrolle lo planteado en torno al concepto de “fragilidad”.

8-Explique las ideas vinculadas por but y therefore en el párrafo 6.

9-Describa el rol que han jugado históricamente los acuerdos entre líderes teniendo en cuenta tanto los aspectos positivos como los negativos presentados en los párrafos 7 y 8.

10-Desarrolle las tres hipótesis que destacan la relevancia de las instituciones en la configuración de los incentivos que conducen a la violencia.

11-Se afirma que las sociedades se arriesgan a repetir un círculo vicioso en cuanto a la violencia en determinadas circunstancias. Desarrolle el planteo.

12-Identifique los núcleos temáticos y elabore un resumen del texto en no más de 500 palabras.

The vicious cycle of weak institutional legitimacy and violence

Much good work has been done on conceptualizing the relationship between institutions and violence, both historically (North, Wallis, and Weingast and many others); in contemporary analysis of the coercive capacities of the state (Fearon and Laitin); and in relation to processes of democratization (Goldstone and others). The policy world has also focused on the relationship between state-building and peace-building, including work by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) International Network on Conflict and Fragility, as well as other bilateral, regional, and multilateral...
institutions. New research for this Report from Fearon, Walter, and Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz explores how the characteristics of state-society institutions and governance outcomes are associated with risk of violence. Meanwhile, recent research supports the finding that states with weak institutions run the greatest risk of the onset and recurrence of civil war, and of extreme levels of criminal violence. These studies should be further expanded and tested, but, taken together, they provide compelling early evidence that institutions are indeed critical for avoiding violence.

2 The capacity and accountability of institutions both matter. The accountability of institutions—expressed, for example, in the results described above on human rights, corruption, and the presence of a written constitution—appear to matter as much as their capacity. Both capacity and accountability are applicable to security, political, and economic systems: political scientists typically use the term “accountability” to refer to processes or political representation, for example, while economists more often use the term to refer to responsible use of public funds and responsiveness to citizen needs and complaints. For this Report, “legitimacy” refers to the responsiveness of institutions and is used as shorthand for capacity, inclusion, and accountability. Several sources of legitimacy have been identified in the state-building literature. The most important are as follows:

• **Political legitimacy (accountability) and inclusion**, or the use of credible political processes to make decisions that reflect shared values and preferences, provide the voice for all citizens equally and account for these decisions. This includes providing information to citizens and mechanisms for legal recourse to resolve disputes and complaints, including complaints against the state. This can also be considered to include international legitimacy: the state’s exercise of responsible sovereignty as laid out under international law.

• **Performance legitimacy (capacity)** earned by the effective discharge by the state of its agreed duties, particularly the provision of security, economic oversight and services, and justice.

3 Recent events demonstrate how different aspects of institutional legitimacy can relate to conflict and violence. The Middle East and North African countries generally possess relatively strong institutional capacity, but their systems have historically scored low on indicators of accountability. In some countries, such as Libya, institutions have remained more personalized than in neighboring states such as Egypt and Tunisia, and perceived tensions between regional, ethnic, or tribal groups are higher. This may help explain why initial demands for change in Egypt and Tunisia were managed largely peacefully, whereas protests in Libya escalated into civil conflict.

4 Fragile institutions and poor governance help explain why similar external shocks can produce violence in one country but not in another. Consider external economic stress and the long association of sharp food price increases with urban instability. In mapping food protests during the 2006–08 period of price spikes against government effectiveness data,
the occurrence of violence was much higher in developing countries with less capable governance.

The essential links between institutional weakness, governance, and violence are captured in the concept of “fragility”. Weak capacity, accountability, and legitimacy of institutions are the basis of many definitions of state fragility. The World Bank, for example, uses indicators of institutional strength to identify fragile situations. And the last decade has seen a sharper international focus on the developmental and security implications of “fragile situations,” and a focus on the links between state-building and peace-building.

*Why does the lack of legitimate institutions open the risk of recurring violence?*

All societies face stresses, *but* only some succumb to repeated violence. Unemployment, income shocks, rising inequalities between social groups, external security threats, and international organized crime—all of these have plausible causal relationships with violence. The analytical problem in identifying may vary, but the underlying reason for societies’ inability to resist stresses is that their institutions are too weak to mediate them peacefully. Durable solutions to violence, *therefore*, require more than addressing each individual stress—they require action to address the underlying weaknesses in institutional legitimacy.

Solutions that do not involve transforming institutions may postpone rather than solve problems. Throughout history, agreements between powerful leaders have been the most common strategy to prevent large scale violence—“I’ll prevent my armed men from attacking your territory if you prevent yours from attacking mine, so that we can all profit from trade or selling natural resources.” As North, Wallis, and Weingast suggest, if these arrangements create sufficient incentives for powerful leaders and organizations, they can contain violence. Such arrangements, however, lead to a political system that manipulates the economy, so that economic rents are an essential component of the stability. Unfortunately, such arrangements are personal and rarely lead to the development of impersonal institutions that can act irrespective of whether a particular leader is still in power, or to wider governance improvements that protect citizens’ interests. These “elite pacts” can establish limits on violence, but this type of agreement is subject to constant renegotiation as circumstances change, and the threat of violence remains.

Does violence recur because, without impersonal institutions, elite pacts have difficulty in adapting to change? This Report’s work on institutional correlations is new, and more research is needed on why countries with weak formal institutions experience repeated bouts of violence. One hypothesis is that these systems have difficulty in adapting to change—because agreements are personal and need to be renegotiated when leaders die or lose power, or when new internal and external pressures force a change in the division of economic or political benefits. A further consideration is that these systems may lead to the buildup of grievances over time—possibly because corruption and coercion attract external condemnation and domestic protests. These factors are surely becoming more important as the global pace of change quickens, the vulnerability to external shocks increases, and the tolerance of corruption and coercion diminishes.
Institutional economics offers a wide body of theory and evidence on how institutions (formal and informal rules) facilitate and constrain the behavior of economic and political actors (individuals, groups, and firms). In relation to violence, this Report offers three key hypotheses for institutions to matter in shaping the incentives for violence:

- **Institutional capacity.** Strong policing and defense capacities give states the power to overcome armed threats from rebel or organized criminal groups. If an individual is contemplating political or criminal violence, the knowledge that the country’s security forces have weak intelligence and coercive capacity will make that person more likely to pursue violent options. Conversely, if the country’s formal institutions do not deliver local justice, education, or employment, an individual has a greater incentive to turn toward nonstate groups that can deliver, even if the groups are violent. Social and family cohesion can also be a critical national capacity: if an individual feels no sense of national pride, or if the family and community place no value on abiding by national laws, there is less to constrain that person from taking up arms against the state or engaging in criminal activities. But increasing the capacity of the state is fraught with risks: particularly when some leaders perceive a threat to their own interests from well organized security forces and economic institutions, and where citizens are fragmented and unorganized, unable to insist that economic, justice, and security services be provided equitably to all citizens.

- **Inclusion.** Government capacity alone is not enough, however: many of the stresses described in this chapter relate to the failure of institutions to make all ethnic, religious, or social groups feel equally served by the actions of the state. If the geographic, ethnic, or religious community an individual belongs to is excluded from political or economic opportunities (for example, from taking part in political decision making, civil service appointments, education, health care, social protection, access to infrastructure, or business opportunities), that person will have less to lose by resorting to rebellion or crime. Accountable and inclusive political, social, and economic institutions can mediate contests between different classes or ethnic, religious, or regional groups peacefully—ensuring that each party feels adequately represented in decision making, that demands are heard, and that rights are protected. But inclusion is less likely for groups that are fragmented and unorganized—indeed, their very fragmentation could explain the ease with which the political system abuses them.

- **Active abuse and institutional accountability.** If a person or a family member is tortured or arbitrarily imprisoned or preyed upon by corrupt officials, that person may have little to lose by risking injury or further imprisonment by taking up a life of crime or rebellion. Accountable security forces and government agencies avoid the human rights abuses and corruption that can fuel grievances and create incentives for violent opposition.

Societies that rely on elite pacts, coercion, and patronage to control violence risk repeating a vicious cycle. Where agreements among elites to end fighting do not result in a
transformation in state-society institutions and better governance outcomes, they remain vulnerable to the same stresses that precipitated fighting in the first place. In these circumstances, any stresses that shift the balance of power—such as the death of a leader, external security threats, or economic and demographic pressures—risk further violence. At some point this violence will be ended through another elite pact, but without broader and deeper institutional transformation, the cycle will repeat. The vicious cycle can become more difficult to escape over time, as each successive bout of violence further weakens institutions and destroys social capital. In countries where children have been brutalized as victims or witnesses of violence, or, worse yet, as perpetrators by being coerced to be child combatants, the lasting trauma and lost human and social capital become an impediment to future social progress.

The challenge for these societies is escaping this vicious cycle of repeated violence. Historically, large-scale episodes of violence have been a feature of all human societies. This cycle is doomed to repeat until societies find collective institutions to mediate and control violence. Escaping this vicious cycle is the focus of the rest of this Report.